

VZCZCXRO5348  
OO RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHYG  
DE RUEHC #4933/01 1482312  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
O 282259Z MAY 09  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0666  
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4988  
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0220  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 7261  
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE  
NATO EU COLLECTIVE  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8255  
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1444  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4428  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5249  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4638  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0886  
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 7420  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9154  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6293

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 054933

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS  
GENENVA FOR CD DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [CDG](#) [MCAP](#) [NASA](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [TSPA](#) [UNPUOS](#)  
SUBJECT: NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON SATELLITE COLLISION  
BRIEFING AND SPACE TCBMS

REF: A. MOSCOW 556  
[1](#)B. STATE 28279  
[1](#)C. BERLIN 188  
[1](#)D. BRUSSELS 222  
[1](#)E. BRUSSELS 524  
[1](#)F. MOSCOW 435

[1](#)1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 6-7 below.

[1](#)2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On March 6, Embassy Moscow received a non-paper from Russian MFA North America Desk Counselor Aleksandr Shilin providing information on the February 10 collision of U.S. and Russian satellites (REF A). In providing this non-paper, Russian MFA officials expressed an interest in facilitating continued exchanges between the U.S. and Russian governments on this matter.

[1](#)3. (U) On March 24, the U.S. Delegation to the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) noted the ongoing USG review of the collision and stated that the USG looks forward to discussing the appropriate results at the full COPUOS in June (REF B). The U.S. DEL also noted that the USG had been in contact with Russia regarding the collision.

[1](#)4. (SBU) U.S. Allies also share interest in U.S. analyses of the satellite collision and its implications for space security policy (REFS C and D). On May 6 and 8, experts from ISN/MDSP, DoD's Office of Space Policy and Information Operations, and the Joint Staff discussed the collision during bilateral space security dialogues with France and the United Kingdom. Discussions on the collision are also planned in the coming weeks in bilateral space security dialogues with Germany, Japan, and Canada.

[1](#)5. (SBU) In addition to supporting expanded dialogues with allies on space situational awareness (REF E), State also sees this incident as an impetus to the resumption of a dialogue with Russia on a range of space security topics, including transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) relating to military and other space operations. For the past two years, the U.S. has sought to cooperate with Moscow on TCBMs in diplomatic and military channels, but they were stymied by Russia's insistence on linking any discussion

of voluntary TCBMs to its joint proposal with China for a binding "Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty." END BACKGROUND.

¶6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy to pass the U.S. non-paper in paragraph 8 below to appropriate host government officials at the MFA and to provide a copy to the Russian Space Agency. Post should also provide a copy of the non-paper to the Russian Ministry of Defense.

¶7. (SBU) After providing the non-paper, Post is requested to inform MFA officials that Brigadier General Susan Helms, Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Strategic Command, will be providing the briefings on the collision. General Helms flew on four space shuttle missions and served aboard the International Space Station in 2001 as part of Expedition 2, which was commanded by Cosmonaut Yuri Usachev.

Embassy also may draw upon the contingency talking points in paragraph 9 on an "if raised" basis. END ACTION REQUEST.

¶8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER:

Non-Paper  
May 28, 2009

The United States is pleased to respond to the Russian Federation's non-paper of March 5, 2009, regarding the

STATE 00054933 002 OF 003

collision of the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 satellites on February 10, 2009.

As the Russian non-paper noted, this incident illustrates the increasingly congested and complex nature of the space environment. It also serves as a reminder of the need for our two governments to expand cooperation with other spacefaring nations on measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of operations in the space environment.

The United States welcomes the technical information provided by Russia in its non-paper. This data is a useful contribution to the presentation that the United States plans to make on the collision at the 52nd Session of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on June 9 in Vienna, Austria.

As senior officials from our respective Governments have noted, this incident can serve as an impetus to increase international cooperation and to improve bilateral transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) relating to our respective space activities.

The United States also welcomes Russia's interest in resuming discussions between experts on TCBMs relating to military and other space operations. Such a pragmatic dialogue can provide opportunities for considering the feasibility and desirability of TCBMs for space activities.

To help improve our mutual understanding of the collision and its implications for the long-term sustainability of the space environment, U.S. Government experts would welcome the opportunity to preview their planned presentations to the COPUOS to Russian experts on June 8 in Vienna.

In addition to exchanging perspectives on the collision and its direct implications, this meeting between governmental experts could also be expanded to identify and discuss potential opportunities for greater international cooperation, including the possibility of:

-- A joint study by U.S. and Russian experts on the long-term implications of orbital collisions for human spaceflight safety and other space activities.

-- Collaboration regarding bilateral TCBMs such as noted in Russia's submission of May 11, 2007, to the report of the

United Nations Secretary General on "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities" (UN General Assembly document A/62/114, dated August 3, 2007).

Looking beyond such bilateral cooperation, a continuing dialogue between U.S. and Russian experts could also consider how our two governments can work with the European Union and other members of the Euro-Atlantic community to develop consensus on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs which are acceptable to the greatest number of governments.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER.

19. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS:

Space Arms Control

----- The Administration is commencing a review of all aspects of national space policy, including arms control policy. Our bilateral discussions on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs should proceed without linkage to broader questions on the feasibility and desirability of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for space.

U.S. Co-Sponsorship of UN General Assembly Resolution on TCBMs:

--As it did in 2007 and 2008, the United States remains willing to consider co-sponsorship with Russia of a UN

STATE 00054933 003 OF 003

General Assembly resolution which would commission a Group of Government Experts study on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs.

--To ensure maximum flexibility, any such draft resolution should not be linked to the start of negotiations on proposals such as the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) in the Conference on Disarmament or other fora. U.S. experts would welcome the opportunity for further discussions on this topic on the margins of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research conference on June 15 and 16 in Geneva, Switzerland.

END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS.

110. (U) Please slug responses for ISN/MDSP-RBuenneke, OES/SAT-DTurner, and EUR/PRA-MNash.  
CLINTON